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Crimes of Sexual Violence in the War Crimes Chamber of the
State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Successes and Challenges
by Angela J. Edman*

E

Introduction

March 2005 to continue the work of
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY),1 the War Crimes Chamber of the
State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (WCC) faces substantial
obstacles regarding prosecution of crimes of sexual violence.
Estimates range from 20,000 to 50,000 wartime rapes in Bosnia
alone.2 Historically, rape and other crimes of sexual violence
have gone unaddressed by courts, especially in wartime, and
many jurisprudential barriers have prevented effective prosecutions. Prosecuting crimes of sexual violence successfully at the
national level is crucial to bringing a sense of justice to victims
and their families and ending a culture of impunity.
Thus far, the WCC has completed at least six trials involving crimes of sexual violence,3 and additional cases are currently at trial or in appellate proceedings. This article examines
how the WCC has treated these prosecutions and analyzes
numerous challenges, particularly the WCC’s definition of
rape, and its reliance, or lack thereof, on previous international
jurisprudence.
The WCC has made significant progress in prosecuting
several rape cases, defining sexual violence, jurisprudentially
defining sexual slavery and enslavement, and holding that
rape can constitute persecution and torture. If it is to continue
successfully prosecuting crimes of sexual violence, however,
the WCC must: 1) amend its definition of rape to remove the
requirement of force or the threat of force, and replace it with
a definition requiring and emphasizing coercive circumstances;
2) include gender as a basis of persecution when prosecuting
crimes of sexual violence as persecution, instead of only considering ethnicity, religion or political views; and 3) improve the
quality of the Judgments by utilizing international jurisprudence
from other tribunals.
stablished in
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the

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

The Code, however, further defines rape as, “coercing another
by force or by threat or immediate attack upon his life or limb,
or the life or limb of a person close to him, to sexual intercourse
or an equivalent sexual act.” This language is a misguided addition because jurisprudence from the ICTY and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) consistently holds that
force or the threat of force is not an element of rape.5
Under those established precedents, all crimes of sexual violence must be committed under coercive circumstances. Courts
have vacillated on whether absence of consent should be an
element of rape.6 However, when rape is committed as an international crime, it involves widespread attacks or armed conflict,
and thus the circumstances are “inherently coercive and make
the question of consent redundant.”7 The Akayesu Trial Chamber
provided the clearest explanation of “coercive circumstances,”
when it stated:

Rape as Defined by Code and Jurisprudence
Comparing Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Definition of
Rape with International Standards

Coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a
show of physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or
desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion
may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as
armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe
among refugee women.8

The Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the
Code) mostly replicates provisions in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), which regards sexual violence as a crime against humanity. According to both the Code
and the Rome Statute, specific acts of sexual violence that constitute crimes against humanity include “rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”4

This interpretation indicates that while physical force and
threats are likely sufficient to show that coercive circumstances
existed, they are not necessary to prove coercion. By noting
that coercion can be inherent in situations of armed conflict, the

* Angela J. Edman is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law, and former Co-Editor-in-Chief of the Human Rights Brief.

21

Akayesu Trial Chamber negated the possibility of non-consent
as an element of the international crime of rape. Notably, by
using the disjunctive “or” between the phrases “armed conflict” and “the military presence of Interhamwe among refugee
women,” the ICTR seems to say that coercive circumstances can
be inherent even in situations in which there is no immediate
armed conflict, but in which female refugees of one ethnic group
are in the presence of members of the military of a different
ethnic group. This becomes a significant ruling when applied to
the situation in Bosnia (assuming the rule is applicable to internally displaced persons as well as refugees). The ruling indicates

that because corroboration is not required for witness testimony
in general, it cannot be required for witness testimony regarding
crimes of sexual violence either. It is important that the WCC
noted this early on in its jurisprudence, in hopes that future
defendants will not attempt to discredit victim-witnesses who
are testifying about sexual violence committed against them by
accusing them of having no corroboration. It is also positive that
the WCC holds crimes of sexual violence to the same evidentiary standards as other crimes.
Another positive development is the WCC’s recognition
that the age of rape victims, many of whom were children and
teenagers, is an aggravating circumstance. The Samardžić Trial
Judgment held that raping girls under 16 increases the gravity
of the crime. The Appeals Chamber further explained that the
trauma is particularly serious for girls, who are more vulnerable and are left with “lasting and far-reaching effects on their
mental and physical health.” Recognizing a victim’s young age
as an aggravating factor is consistent with the ICTY’s decision
in Prosecutor v. Deronjić, which noted that, “(t)he Appeals
Chamber… has often affirmed the use of aggravating factors
related to victim characteristics such as age.”10
There have also been setbacks in the WCC’s rape juris
prudence. First, the WCC has relied on the definition of rape
in the ICTY’s Kunarac decision, which flies in the face of
Akayesu by making non-consent an element, thus focusing on
the victim’s behavior and excluding prosecution of otherwise
clear cases of coercive sexual violence. The WCC’s Šimšić Trial
Chamber relied on the Kunarac definition, but did not discuss
consent; rather it stated, without elaboration, that coercive circumstances existed. Although consent was not raised here, it
still seems advisable to rely on a definition that does not include
non-consent as an element. Adding non-consent to the analysis
and relying on Kunarac confuses it and invites retrenchment
to an old view of the elements of rape that was debunked by
Akayesu. The WCC should refrain from adding non-consent,
in order to avoid focusing attention on victims’ behavior.
Additionally, eliminating consent and focusing on coercion will
enhance predictability and doctrinal clarity, and increase deterrence by providing clearer definitional boundaries.
Also worrisome is the WCC’s invocation of morality when
adjudicating crimes of sexual violence.11 The Stanković Appeals
Chamber used a rape victim’s morality as a reason to exclude
the public from her testimony. The Šimšić Trial Chamber went
even further, stating:

The WCC has made
significant progress in
prosecuting several rape
cases, defining sexual
violence, jurisprudentially
defining sexual slavery and
enslavement, and holding
that rape can constitute
persecution and torture.
that for crimes of sexual violence charged as war crimes, but in
which it is difficult for the prosecutor to prove armed conflict
existed at the time and place of the crime, the prosecutor may
decide to charge the crime instead as a crime against humanity
— provided it meets the other chapeaux elements — so that the
element of coercion is already proven if the refugees or internally displaced persons were in the presence of the armed forces
of another ethnic group.
It is uncertain why the Code includes a requirement of force
or the threat of force. The Code should be amended to re-define
rape, using a definition, perhaps modeled after that found in
Akayesu and confirmed in the Čelebic´i case.9 That approach
is more consistent with international jurisprudence regarding
force, consent, and coercion.

(t)he Court was guided by reason of protection of
morality in a democratic society, having in mind
the traditional position of a woman in the BosniaHerzegovina milieu, even where some female witnesses expressed readiness to confront openly with the
accused during their public confession.12

Advancements and Retrenchments in the War Crimes
Chamber Rape Jurisprudence

Scholars criticize invoking morality when discussing crimes
of sexual violence, often referring to the Geneva Conventions’
protection of a woman’s “honor,” as diverting the focus from
the crime as an act of violence, and focusing on the woman as
a possession whose virginity is most valuable.13 The Stanković
Judgment did not need to invoke the victim’s morality; it elaborated other reasons sufficient to justify closing her testimony to
the public, such as preventing the accused from revealing her

Despite the Code’s worrisome definition of rape, the WCC
has made several important decisions regarding the conviction
of rape and its elements that have advanced conformity with
international standards. First, the WCC decided in Prosecutor
v. Janković that corroboration of a witness’s testimony is not
required for crimes of sexual violence. Notably, the WCC held
22
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Bosnian government troops reach out towards a Muslim woman by a roadside in Travnik, central Bosnia.

identity, protecting her from the trauma of public discussion,
and protecting her privacy. However, Šimšić seems to create
the dangerous possibility that, due to a woman’s “traditional
position” in society (which the WCC failed to define), she may
be prevented from testifying in public to preserve a sense of
societal morality, even when she wants to testify in public and
face her attacker.

perpetrators were both charged with rape; each seemingly possessed equivalent rank in the military and committed the same
crimes.18 Yet the Prosecutor charged Samardžić with sexual
slavery and Stanković with enslavement, thus indicating that the
lack of a clear definition leads to inconsistent charges for the
same conduct.

Development of the Crime of Enslavement Through
the Stankovi ććCase

Creating Precedent on the Crimes of Sexual
Slavery and Enslavement

While both Stanković and Samardžić were charged with
bringing girls to Karaman and keeping them as slaves, the WCC
focused on Stanković’s role in establishing Karaman as a rape
camp. The Trial Chamber detailed the consistent testimonies of
five witnesses that established Stanković’s pattern of capturing females and bringing them to Karaman, particularly his
authoritative role as the person in charge of assigning females to
soldiers for rape. In establishing enslavement, the Trial Chamber
noted that Stanković held a position of authority in the house,
claimed one detainee as his own and treated her as his property,
approved soldiers for entry to Karaman and “assigned” the girls
to them, and sometimes brought soldiers to the house himself.
The Trial Chamber discussed at length his role in subjecting
female detainees to forced labor. The remainder of the charges
involved acts of rape and forced labor by the accused.
It is not clear why the indictment separated the charges of
enslavement and rape when the actus reus of both are so closely
related: the rapes occurred in the context of enslavement, and
a characteristic of the enslavement was rape. The Prosecutor
may have done this out of caution, as Stanković was not only
the first case transferred from the ICTY pursuant to ICTY Rule
11 bis, but the indictment was also one of the WCC’s first to
include charges of sexual violence.19 Thus, the Prosecutor may
have thought it wise to separate the elements to their most basic

The BiH Criminal Code includes both enslavement and
sexual slavery as crimes against humanity. The recognition
of sexual slavery and enslavement in the context of crimes of
sexual violence is a recent development in the field of international criminal law and is significant because it highlights
the element of ownership of a human being in many crimes
of sexual violence. Like the Rome Statute, the Code defines
enslavement as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person, and includes the
exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons,
in particular women and children.”14 Although the Code and
the Rome Statute include it as a sexual violence-based crime
against humanity, both fail to define sexual slavery.15 Unlike the
Rome Statute, however, the Code does not provide an Elements
of Crimes section,16 thus leaving the Chambers to define sexual
slavery through their jurisprudence.
Four of the five sexual violence cases completed by the
WCC thus far involved charges of either enslavement or sexual
slavery related to crimes committed by Bosnian Serb military,
paramilitary, or police forces against Bosniak women and girls
in the Karaman House, a building that served as a rape camp
and was frequently referred to as the “Karaman Brothel.”17 In
the first two cases completed, Samardžić and Stanković, the
23

form to encourage clear jurisprudential definitions of the crimes,
as well as to ensure a conviction on at least one of the crimes.
Or perhaps the Prosecutor viewed enslavement as an umbrella
crime, with rape being one of the constituent crimes.
Regardless, the WCC’s interpretation of enslavement fits the
Code’s definition by focusing on proof that Stanković exercised
ownership rights over the detained females. Although the decision does not specifically refer to the ICTY’s more detailed
elements of enslavement, the WCC’s interpretation of enslavement is consistent with the ICTY’s, which lists as indicia of
ownership:

male family members, and her lack of money or a possibility
of escape rendered superfluous any inquiry into the presence
or absence of consent. Samardžić thus created jurisprudence
consistent with the definition of sexual slavery in the Criminal
Code of BiH (and in the Rome Statute), as well as with ICTY
jurisprudence on crimes of sexual violence committed in the
context of enslavement.
Jurisprudence on sexual slavery and enslavement in the
context of crimes of sexual violence is a relatively recent
development. It constitutes a significant development because
it highlights patriarchal power structures underlying and permitting many of these crimes. It demonstrates that such crimes do
not occur as single events, but as part of a contiguous existence
of ownership that constitutes a crime in itself. However, to best
combat impunity for crimes of sexual violence involving ownership of a person, the WCC should explicitly refer to previous
international jurisprudence to make its reasoning clear. It also
must create and maintain jurisprudentially precise and distinct
definitions of sexual slavery and enslavement to avoid inconsistent charging and reflect most realistically the nature of the
crimes.

(…) control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, psychological control, measures
taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force
or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality
and forced labor.20
Finally, it also is not clear why the Prosecutor chose to charge
enslavement instead of sexual slavery. Because the Code does
not define sexual slavery, the Prosecutor may have strategically
chosen enslavement to increase the chances of a conviction for
a crime with a clear definition. Also, the Prosecutor may have
wished to draw attention to the non-sexual nature of the forced
labor for which Stanković was also eventually prosecuted, such
as forcing the detainees to wake the soldiers, cook, and clean for
them, as forced labor can demonstrate enslavement.

Crimes of Sexual Violence as Persecution
Prosecutor v. Šimšić is the WCC’s first case convicting an
accused for sexual violence as persecution. Prosecutions of gender-based crimes of persecution are possible because the Code
enumerates gender as a prohibited basis of persecution.23 The
inclusion of gender as a prohibited basis is a new development
in international criminal law, as neither the ICTY nor the ICTR
Statutes include it,24 whereas the Rome Statute does. However,
the indictment did not specify that the persecution was genderbased; but rather that rape was committed on the basis of
“political, national, ethnic, cultural and religious grounds.” In
this sense, the WCC’s interpretation of persecution as related to
gender mirrors that of the ICTY.
The ICTY Trial Chamber found in Krstić that rape can be
committed with persecutorial intent; however, the ICTY limited
the basis of persecution to the enumerated purposes and did
not include gender, thus requiring a nexus between the rape
and another act of persecution based not on gender.25 While
the WCC’s recognition that rape can be a form of persecution
is significant, the Prosecution should have tried to prove the
rapes were committed as persecution not only against Muslims
because of their religious beliefs and ethnicity, but also that
the rapes were committed to persecute Muslim women, due to
their unique characteristics and position in society. The crimes
committed against them illuminated, took advantage of, and perverted roles that women may traditionally play as homemakers,
as evidenced through forced labor in the form of cooking and
cleaning, and through their roles as providers of sexual pleasure
to the soldiers.
The Prosecutor demonstrated the elements of persecution,
replicating those laid out in Tadić : that there is a discriminatory act or omission, that the act or omission is based on one of
the prohibited purposes, and there is an intent to infringe on an
individual’s enjoyment of a basic or fundamental right.26 The
Prosecutor could have simultaneously demonstrated that, in
addition to group membership of the Islamic religion, the detainees were discriminated against on the basis of their gender.

Development of the Crime of Sexual Slavery
Through the Samardžic´ Case
The Appeals Chamber sentenced Nedo Samardžić to 24
years in prison for nine counts of crimes against humanity, seven
of which involved either rape or sexual slavery. By requiring
that Samardžić had exercised powers attaching to the rights of
ownership, and caused the victims to engage in sexual acts, the
WCC’s definition of sexual slavery matches the Rome Statute’s
definition. The WCC found that the elements of sexual slavery
were established in part through witness testimony regarding
the nature of the Karaman House. The witnesses consistently
described Karaman as a brothel in which they were traded,
bought and sold; were forced to cook, clean and do other chores;
and were subjected to rape almost on a daily basis. The WCC
also found that Samardžić himself committed multiple rapes.
The ICTY Statute does not define sexual slavery, but crimes
of sexual violence committed during enslavement have been
prosecuted as separate crimes against humanity.21 The WCC
echoed the ICTY Kunarac Appeals decision when it stated that
a lack of resistance or obvious and constant disagreement to the
conditions of enslavement cannot be interpreted as consent.22
Kunarac went on to state that lack of consent is not an element
of the crime of enslavement, since “enslavement flows from
claimed rights of ownership.” However, the decision never
explicitly stated that it relied on Kunarac.
The Samardžić Appeals decision also seemed to apply
Kunarac by listing the circumstances of the victim’s detention at Karaman House as being so inherently coercive as to
make consent a non-issue. Specifically, the surrounding presence of armed forces and police, the victim’s separation from
24

Crimes of Sexual Violence as Torture

are not binding on the WCC, looking to the jurisprudence of
other tribunals can be very helpful, especially when deciding
on new issues of law, like the Čelebic´i judgment did when it
analyzed whether rape can be the basis for a torture prosecution. This failure to consider previous jurisprudence makes the
WCC’s judgments more susceptible to criticism; if other parties
cannot tell on what basis the WCC makes decisions, its dicta and
holdings are easier to discredit.

Prosecutor v. Janković is the WCC’s first prosecution of rape
as the crime against humanity of torture. Janković was a leader
in a paramilitary group and in the Bosnian Serb Army, and
ordered and perpetrated acts of torture against male and female
Bosnian Muslims in Foč a. The WCC analyzed interrogations
of female detainees to establish the framework for torture. A
witness testified that Janković demanded she tell him the names
of her village’s residents and which of them had arms, and that
he threatened her with gang rape. Though she tried to comply,
Janković transported her to a barracks on the Drina River where
he orchestrated a gang rape by at least ten soldiers. The rapes
took place in a room in which she could hear her uncle outside
screaming, being beaten, and then being shot. Other witnesses
who were detained there also testified about interrogations and
rapes.
The Code’s definition of torture as a crime against humanity is identical to the Rome Statute’s, requiring the “intentional
infliction of severe pain and suffering, whether physical or
mental, upon a person in the custody or under control of the
accused,” not including suffering resulting from lawful sanctions.27 Both also require that crimes against humanity be
committed in the course of an attack directed against a civilian
population that is pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy. The WCC listed the legal requirements of torture as causing severe pain and suffering, being intentional, and
having a prohibited purpose. Those requirements are consistent
with the standard established by the ICTY in Kunarac,28 which
adopted the Torture Convention’s definition, but excluded the
Convention’s state action requirement. The ICTY reasoned
that while human rights law as embodied by the Convention is
directed at states, international humanitarian law affords more
protection to individuals and does not require state action.29
Rape had previously been prosecuted as torture under
international law. The ICTY in Čelebic´i extensively analyzed
the requirements of prosecuting rape as torture by examining
jurisprudence from other international bodies.30 In analyzing
the case of Mejía v. Peru at the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights,31 the Čelebic´i Trial Chamber deduced that when
determining whether a rape caused severe pain and suffering,
one should consider not only the physical effects, but also the
psychological and social effects of the crime.
In analyzing the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
case Aydin v. Turkey32, the Čelebic´i Trial Chamber deduced
that, because the ECHR stated that it would have reached the
same conclusion that a rape violated Article 3 of the Euro
pean Convention (prohibiting torture and cruel and inhuman
or degrading treatment) even if the victim’s rape had been
considered separately from other acts of torture that were committed against the victim, the ECHR affirmed that rape inflicts a
level of suffering at such a severe level as to constitute torture.
Č elebic´i then referred to Akayesu, which ruled that rape constitutes torture because it constitutes a violation of personal
dignity, and is used for the same purposes as torture, including: “intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination,
punishment, (and) control or destruction of a person.” Lastly,
Čelebic´i referred to several United Nations commission reports
that affirmed rape constitutes a form of torture.33
Janković did not reference Čelebic´i or other international
jurisprudence. While decisions of other international tribunals

Despite the Code’s
worrisome definition of
rape, the WCC has made
several important decisions
regarding the conviction of
rape and its elements that
have advanced conformity
with international
standards.
More importantly, although the tribunals’ decisions are not
binding on one another, the international criminal law concepts created by past jurisprudence have essential normative
components that are universal, and failing to analyze past case
law fractures international criminal legal doctrine. In fact, the
Appeals Chamber often revokes Trial Chamber judgments due
to a violation of the Criminal Procedure Code, which permits
vacatur where a Chamber fails to explain the grounds and cite
reasons for the decision.34
The tendency to ignore existing jurisprudence could result
from the newness of Bosnia’s criminal codes and the judiciary’s
transformation from a civil law system that does not utilize stare
decisis to more of a common law system. If this is the problem,
the international judges at the WCC should consider utilizing
their positions to introduce more analysis of previous decisions
by international tribunals.
Regardless of whether Janković should have referenced past
jurisprudence, its conclusions seem consistent with the state of
the existing international criminal case law. Aside from meeting
the Kunarac definition, the WCC also met Akayesu’s prohibited purposes requirement for torture, which lists as prohibited
purposes:
(a) to obtain information or a confession from the
victim or a third person; (b) to punish the victim or
25

Conclusion

a third person for an act committed or suspected of
having been committed by either of them; (c) for the
purpose of intimidating or coercing the victim or the
third person; (or) (d) for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.35

The WCC has made important strides in prosecuting crimes
of sexual violence committed during the war in Bosnia. By ruling that rape can constitute both torture and persecution, and
that those crimes against youth are particularly grave, the WCC
has begun to recognize through its jurisprudence that crimes of
sexual violence are especially serious. Defining sexual slavery
was another crucial step, as was ruling that corroboration is not
required for witness testimony on rape.
Additional progress is needed, however, particularly in taking the focus off the victim’s behavior. The WCC should amend
its definition of rape, which currently enables the defense to
focus on a victim’s behavior by raising force and consent-related
issues, and replace it with one modeled after Akayesu. This
would require coercive circumstances and not force or consent,
reflecting the actual reality of sexual violence and bringing
the focus back to the perpetrator’s behavior. The WCC should
similarly stop invoking morality. The WCC has created strong
jurisprudence on sexual slavery and enslavement, but needs to
create clearer distinctions between them to allow the Prosecutor
to most effectively and consistently define and charge crimes,
and contribute to a greater understanding of the true nature
of such crimes. As gender is enumerated as a prohibited basis
of persecution, the WCC should consider gender as a basis of
persecution, when appropriate, instead of only using nationality, ethnicity and religion. Lastly, an abundance of international
jurisprudence exists from the ad hoc tribunals on crimes of
sexual violence. The WCC should consult these decisions when
facing issues of law that is has never faced before.
The WCC has many challenges before it, and has begun to
effectively address them. The WCC, however, must address the
problems discussed to ensure the development of the strongest
regime for combating impunity for crimes of sexual violence,
and bringing justice to survivors of atrocities in Bosnia. HRB

The decision implied first that the Kunarac criteria were
met, when it explained that the legal requirements for torture
have been met because the gang-rape caused the witness severe
pain and suffering, was intentional, and had prohibited purposes.
It then met the Akayesu prohibited purposes element when it
explained that the gang-rape was discriminatory as it was based
on the victim’s ethnicity, that Janković interrogated her to
extract information, that he intimidated and threatened her with
rape, and that he punished her for giving dissatisfactory answers
during her interrogation by orchestrating the gang-rape.
Interestingly, the Akayesu prohibited purposes element also
appears separately in Article 190, not under the rubric of crimes
against humanity, but as a stand-alone crime of torture.36 It is
unclear why the Prosecutor did not bring an Article 190 charge
as well, as all of the elements of the crime as listed under
Article 190 were met. As of this date, the Prosecution has not
brought any charges for the stand-alone crime of torture, perhaps because bringing various charges together under crimes
against humanity or war crimes makes it easier to establish the
context of the crimes. It may also be because, while torture as a
crime against humanity requires the attack to be part of a state
or organizational policy, torture as a stand-alone crime requires
that the perpetrator either be a public official, or someone with
the consent of a public official (the “state action” requirement).
It is generally more difficult to prove the state action requirement, which derives from human rights law. Nevertheless, it
is an important development that the WCC prosecuted rape as
torture, although it should attempt to deliver clearer decisions
invoking previous international jurisprudence.
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Prosecutor v. Janković, No. KT-RZ-163/05, Trial Judgment
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No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment ¶ 478-479 (16 November 1998) (confirming the Akayesu definition, and stating that it “sees no reason

to depart from the conclusion of the ICTR in the Akayesu Judgment
on this issue”).
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17 Prosecutor v. Samardžić, Indictment, p. 4 (Sarajevo, February
9, 2006). Cases include: Prosecutor v. Samardžić, Prosecutor v.
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